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This paper examines two linked cases of abortive Imperial expansion. The British invasion of Afghanistan and 
the Russian winter expedition to Khiva both took place in 1839, and both ended in disaster. These events were 
linked, not merely by coincidence, but by mutual reactions to intelligence received in Orenburg, St Petersburg, 
Calcutta, London and Tehran. British and Russian officials shared similar fears about each other’s ambitions in 
Central Asia, similar patterns of prejudice, arrogance and ignorance, and a similar sense of entitlement as the self-
conscious agents of two ‘Great Powers’. By examining the decision-making process which preceded these twin cases 
of expansion, and the British and Russian attitude to Central Asian rulers and informants, the paper provides not 
only a deeper understanding of what provoked these particular disasters, but also of the wider process of European 
imperial expansion in the early nineteenth century. 
Introduction 
‘Ici il faut agir a l’anglaise, et cela d’autant plus que c’est contre les Anglais qu’on agit.’1 
In 1839 Britain and Russia both overreached themselves in an abortive advance into Central Asia. 
Lord Auckland’s occupation of Afghanistan and General Perovsky’s attempt to invade Khiva are 
central episodes in the grand narrative of imperial competition and conquest generally known as 
the ‘Great Game’—a narrative in which Central Asians themselves are usually presented either as 
bystanders or as a sort of deadly deus ex machina, whose only role in the drama was to mete out 
bloody punishment to the Europeans whose deluded antics always take centre stage. The British 
were marginal actors in Central Asia, and even the Russians—who ended up conquering most of 
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1 ‘Here we must act as the English do, all the more so because it is against the English that we are acting’: 
Perovsky to Bulgakov, 4 February 1840, ‘Pis’ma grafa V.A. Perovskago k A. Ya Bulgakovu’, Russkii Arkhiv 
[RA], (1878) No. 7 Letter 9 p. 309. 
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it—should not always be at the heart of any history of the conquest. For all the glamour 
surrounding the competition between two Great Powers in an exotic and little-known land, it was 
those who actually lived there who would face the greatest long-term consequences of this 
imperial competition, which, in many respects, endure to this day. 
That said, this paper does not focus on what it was like to be on the receiving end of an invading 
army, nor on the many profound changes that these military incursions would eventually make in 
the lives of Central Asians. Neither does it aim to provide a description of these ‘disasters’ and 
their causes: instead I wish to focus on the process of decision-making that preceded these twin 
episodes, to examine them comparatively, and to consider the extent to which they were linked, 
not simply by coincidence, but through mutual reaction to political intelligence in St Petersburg, 
Orenburg, London, and Calcutta. Although Russia and Britain ostensibly had rather different 
systems of government in this period, in both cases the crucial decisions were taken by small 
coteries of officials acting without any real legislative oversight—in the Russian case because 
there was no legislature, in the British case because before the second half of the twentieth 
century, parliament, and indeed the cabinet, had little direct control over British foreign policy, 
and still less over that of the government of India.2 My contention is that these British and 
Russian officials, whether in the metropole or ‘on the spot’, shared a common military-
bureaucratic institutional culture, common patterns of prejudice and ignorance, and a sense of 
sheer entitlement that came from their self-identification as agents of the European ‘Great 
Powers’. The latter was an idea that had come into increasingly widespread use after the Congress 
of Vienna, initially as a means of categorizing European states.3 It is sometimes assumed that 
Britain’s global pre-eminence remained largely uncontested for almost 50 years after the defeat of 
Napoleon, before a more competitive international landscape helped to provoke a final, frenzied 
phase of European expansion after 1870. In fact, the political settlement of 1815 had left two 
European powers with the ability to act on a global, and not merely European, stage, namely 
Britain and Russia, whose rivalry was already clear to the future war minister and supporter of the 
Khiva expedition, A. I. Chernyshev, at the Congress of Vienna in 1814.4 Certain patterns of 
behaviour were expected of these mutually identified ‘Great Powers’ in order to uphold that 
 
2 Joseph Frankel, ‘Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy’, Political Studies Vol. 7 No. 1 (1959) 
p. 2; David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Longman, 1991) p. 38; Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1969) p. 2; John Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians. The Dynamics of Territorial 
Expansion’, English Historical Review Vol. CXII No.  447 (1997) pp. 624–27. 
3 The popularization of the term ‘Die Grossen Mächte’ is usually attributed to Leopold von Ranke: see Paul 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) pp. xxiv–xxv; Leopold Ranke, 
‘Die Grossen Mächte’, Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift Vol. II (1833), pp. 1–51, although it seems to have been 
used by statesmen and diplomats well before it was adopted by historians. By the 1830s, together with its 
concomitant ‘lesser powers’, it was already current in Anglophone historiography: see Sir Archibald Alison, 
History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revolution in M.DCC.LXXXIX to the Restoration of the 
Bourbons in M.DCCC.XV (Edinburgh: Wm Blackwood, 1835–1842) Vol. I, p. 157; Vol. II, pp. 254–56, 
288–95, 599–600; Vol. V, pp. 305–07; Vol. X, pp. 57, 196, 201, 382, 521, 769, 979.  
4 ‘Si depuis la chute de Napoléon l’Europe a une oppression à craindre, c’est uniquement de la part de 
l’Angleterre’ (‘If since the fall of Napoleon, Europe has an oppression to fear, it is solely on the part of 
England’): ‘Dokladnaya Zapiska A.I. Chernysheva Imperatoru Aleksandru I’ n.d. (April 1814), Sbornik 
Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva (St Petersburg: Imperial Russian Historical Society, 1906) 
Vol. 121, pp. 280–81 
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elusive quality, imperial prestige.5 Beyond Europe, this meant that what were previously more 
symbiotic, if not equal, relationships with ‘Asiatic’ or ‘native’ states as well as those with local 
elites in existing colonies were increasingly couched in terms of overwhelming European cultural 
and racial superiority. As many scholars have argued, this growing arrogance and intolerance 
played a crucial role in stimulating and justifying imperial expansion and dominion, but what is 
less often acknowledged is that these attitudes could also provoke intelligence failures and 
‘information panics’ that simultaneously undermined imperial control.6 It was largely as a result of 
ignoring local advice and disregarding or misinterpreting information from ‘native’ sources, as 
well as a refusal to engage in serious diplomatic negotiations with Central Asian states, that the 
Khiva and Afghanistan expeditions were launched, and then ended in disaster. 
It is in the nature of disasters that they attract much historical attention, and these two are no 
exception. In the case of the Khiva expedition the immediate reason for its failure—the severe 
winter of 1839–40—has always been clear and uncontroversial and detailed descriptions of the 
march are to be found in many contemporary and later sources.7 Its motives and longer-term 
consequences are less well understood: there is no recent English-language historiography on the 
subject, while the standard accounts in Russian still date from the Tsarist period and are almost 
impossible to disentangle from the politics of Russian imperialism in the region. The tone was set 
by the earliest comprehensive account, drawn up by General M.I. Ivanin on Perovsky’s 
instructions, which is largely a description of Khivan perfidy and a celebration of Russian 
heroism and endurance, together with a certain amount of score-settling with Ivanin’s fellow 
officers.8 For subsequent military historians, the 1839 disaster assumed a symbolic significance as 
a tragic, heroic sacrifice, which showcased Russian hardiness and endurance and enabled the 
 
5 Alison, History of Europe, Vol. X, pp. 1016–17; Kennedy, Rise and Fall, pp. 138–39; C.A. Bayly, The Birth of 
the Modern World 1780–1914 (Oxford, 2004) pp. 99, 112–13, 125–29. The Dutch, by contrast, were reluctant 
to think of themselves as imperialists because that was, by definition, an attribute of the ‘Great Powers’: H. 
L. Wesselling ‘The Giant that was a Dwarf, or the Strange History of Dutch Imperialism’ in Andrew Porter 
and Robert Holland (eds) Theory and Practice in the History of European Expansion Overseas. Essays in Honour of 
R.E. Robinson (London: Frank Cass, 1988) pp. 58–70. 
6 See, most obviously, Edward Said, Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978); see also C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information. Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in 
India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) pp. 143–49, 171–79, 315–17, 365–76. 
7 Apart from the accounts by Dal’, Ivanin, and Peslyak described below, see Anonymous, ‘Voennoe 
Predpriyatie Protiv Khivu’, Chteniya v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom 
Universitete (January–March 1860) Kn. 1 pp. 147–66; S. Zykov, ‘Khivinskiya Dela s 1839-1842’, Russkoe Slovo 
(March 1862) pp. 1–58; E.M. Kosyrev, ‘Pokhod v Khivu v 1839 godu (Iz zapisok uchastnika)’ IV No. 8 
(1898) pp. 538–45. 
8 This was first published by Captain D. Golosov, who found the manuscript in the Orenburg archive and, 
not realising that the author was still alive and intended to publish it himself, sent it to the specialist military 
journal Voennyi Sbornik as his own work, although he had only added notes and a historical introduction: 
see M. Ivanin/D. Golosov, ‘Pokhod v Khivu v 1839 godu otryada russkikh voisk, pod nachal’stvom 
General-Ad’yutanta Perovskago’, Voennyi Sbornik [VS] No. 1 (1863) pp. 3–72; No. 2, pp. 309–58 and No. 
3, pp. 3–71. On the article’s publication, Ivanin alerted the editors of the journal, who published an 
explanation: ‘Neobkhodimoe ob”yasnenie’, VS No. 3 (1863) pp. 73–75. This account was then translated 
into English: Anonymous [Golosov/Ivanin], A Narrative of the Russian Military Expedition to Khiva under 
General Perofski, in 1839. Translated from the Russian for the Foreign Department of the Government of India (Calcutta: 
Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1867). Ivanin published his own, revised version of 
the text a few years later: M. Ivanin, Opisanie Zimnego Pokhoda v Khivu v 1839–40g (St Petersburg: Tip. Tov. 
“Obshchestvennaya pol’za”, 1874). 
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army to learn important lessons that would render the later conquest of Central Asia possible.9 It 
was no coincidence that the first two volumes of Colonel A.G. Serebrennikov’s enormous early 
twentieth-century collection of documents on the Russian conquest of Central Asia were largely 
devoted to the ‘winter expedition to Khiva’.10 In the Soviet period, as a clear example of Russian 
aggression, it fitted poorly into the sanctioned narrative of ‘prisoedinenie’, the voluntary ‘uniting’ of 
Central Asia with Russia, and, when mentioned, it was usually considered a legitimate response to 
British machinations and aggression in Central Asia, especially the visits of Captain James Abbott 
and Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear to Khiva in 1839–40.11 
The First Afghan War was a larger and more complex disaster, and the debates and 
recriminations surrounding it lasted at least until the generation of soldiers and politicians who 
were scarred by it had been laid to rest. It has also generated a voluminous historiography, and 
the narrative of what happened and the series of errors that led to the greatest British military 
humiliation of the nineteenth century, have long been clear.12 The chimerical nature of a Russian 
invasion of British India has also long been suspected: as Thomas Metcalf observed in his 1968 
review of J.A. Norris’s The First Afghan War, ‘Until the Russian archives conclusively prove the 
contrary, the Russian threat must remain the product of an overheated imagination.’13 The 
relevant archives in Moscow have now been open for almost 20 years, and yet the unfashionable 
nature of diplomatic and military history for Western historians of the Russian empire,14 and the 
 
9 The canonical versions are: I.N. Zakhar’in, Khiva. Zimnii pokhod v Khivu Perovskago v 1839 godu, – i ‘Pervoe 
posol’stvo v Khivu’ v 1842 godu (St Petersburg: Tip P. P. Soikina 1898), I.N. Zakhar’in, Graf V.A. Perovskii i ego 
zimnii pokhod v Khivu (St Petersburg: Tip. P. P. Soikina, 1901), which are not based on archival sources, but 
on oral accounts collected by the author from veterans in Orenburg in the 1890s, and M.A. Terent’ev, 
Istoriya Zavoevaniya Srednei Azii (St Petersburg: Tip. V. V. Komarova, 1906) Vol. I, pp. 92–172, the official 
history. 
10 A.G. Serebrennikov, Sbornik Materialov dlya istorii zavoevaniya Turkestanskogo Kraya Vol. I: 1839g (Tashkent: 
Tip. Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga, 1908) and Vol. II: 1840g (Tashkent: Tip. Shtaba 
Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga, 1912). 
11 N.A. Khalfin, Rossiya i Khanstva Srednei Azii (pervaya polovina XIXv) (Moscow: “Nauka”, 1974) pp. 280–87. 
See James Abbott, Narrative of a Journey from Heraut to Khiva, Moscow and St Petersburgh During the Late Russian 
Invasion of Khiva, with Some Account of the Court of Khiva and the Kingdom of Khaurism (London: W. H. Allen & 
Co., 1843) 2 vols; and Richmond Shakespear, ‘A Personal Narrative of a Journey from Heraut to 
Ourenbourg, on the Caspian [sic] in 1840’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine Vol. 51 (June 1842) pp. 691–720. 
12 The memoir literature associated with the First Afghan War is too voluminous to be listed here, but the 
originals of many of the most celebrated accounts have long been lost: William Trousdale, ‘Dr. Brydon’s 
Report of the Kabul Disaster and the Documentation of History’, Military Affairs Vol. 47 No. 1 (February 
1983) pp. 26–30. The omissions in the supposedly ‘garbled’ Blue Books of correspondence relating to 
Afghanistan published in 1839 were relatively innocent, although Kaye’s re-edition of 1859 is more 
complete: G.J. Alder, ‘The “Garbled” Blue Books of 1839—Myth or Reality?’, The Historical Journal Vol. 25 
No. 2 (1972) pp. 229–59. The historiography begins with Sir John Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan 
(London, W. H. Allen & Co, 1851, revised editions 1857 and 1874) 2 (3) vols. The most notable later 
contributions are: J.A. Norris, The First Afghan War 1838–1842 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1967); M.E. 
Yapp, Strategies of British India. Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798–1850 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980); Christine 
Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-century Afghanistan. The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan 1826–1823 
(London: Curzon Press, 1997) pp. 38–53; B.D. Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan. Market Relations and 
State Formation on a Colonial Frontier (Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2011) Chapter 3; and William 
Dalrymple, The Return of a King. The Battle for Afghanistan (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
13 Thomas R. Metcalf, ‘Review of J.A. Norris The First Afghan War 1838–42’, The American Historical Review 
Vol. 74 No. 2 (December 1968) p. 614. 
14 D. Lieven, ‘Introduction’ in D. Lieven (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2006) Vol. II , p. 3. 
A. Morrison ‘Twin Imperial Disasters. The invasions of Khiva and Afghanistan in the Russian and British 
official mind, 1839 – 1842’ Modern Asian Studies Vol.48 No.1 (2014) pp.253 - 300 
inability of most historians of South Asia to read Russian, mean that this question has still not 
been examined from the Russian perspective.15  
In this paper I seek to adapt the concept of the ‘official mind’ developed by Ronald Robinson 
and John Gallagher in their pioneering study of the ‘Scramble for Africa’, and subsequently 
refined by other historians, to a comparison of two linked cases of early nineteenth-century 
imperial expansion.16 A central question facing any historian of the European empires is to 
understand why they expanded when they did. This question becomes all the more urgent when, 
as in these two cases, this expansion proved distinctly unprofitable, even damaging, to imperial 
aims. Strategic considerations, economic motives, personal ambition, local initiative, peripheral 
instability, and plain blundering can all have a role to play in determining imperial policy, but a 
crucial part of any analysis of the dynamics of expansion has to be an examination of the 
correspondence and memorandums of those who took the decisions, and an assessment of the 
individual personalities involved.17 As Zara Steiner puts it, ‘documents are only stones in a 
complex mosaic’18 and the limitations of this approach are clear: it does not always distinguish 
clearly between motive and desired outcome, it cannot penetrate the subconscious wishes and 
fears of historical figures, and it must always take account of delusions and deceptions. The 
‘official mind’ is not a single, coherent, omniscient, rational actor which carefully weighs up the 
available information and then makes a decision on the basis of its assessment of the national 
interest (and it is doubtful if Robinson and Gallagher would have recognized this description of 
their argument either).19 Still less is it Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalist’, 
making decisions on the basis of a narrower, but equally ‘rational’ calculation of the economic 
advantage that will accrue to an individual or his class (though Cain and Hopkins do not rule out 
motivations other than economic).20 Rather, the ‘official mind’ should be seen as a bundle of 
prejudices, assumptions, ambition, and ignorance, generally with very imperfect access to 
information, deeply affected by rumour, often reacting wildly and erratically to the pressure of 
‘events’, and with multiple different identities and perspectives, of which Whitehall and St 
Petersburg were not necessarily the most important.21  
 
15 The exceptions are two valuable, if somewhat dated, articles: Philip Mosely, ‘Russian Policy in Asia 
(1838–9)’, Slavonic and East European Review Vol. 14 No. 42 (April 1936) pp. 670–681; and Mikhail 
Volodarsky, ‘The Russians in Afghanistan in the 1830s’, Central Asian Survey Vol. 3 No. 1 (1984) pp. 63–86. 
Yapp made as much use as he could of such Russian archival material as had been published or preserved 
in British diplomatic correspondence in his magisterial Strategies, but he made some errors of interpretation. 
James L. Richardson, ‘The Eastern Crisis 1839–1841’ in J.L. Richardson Crisis Diplomacy. The Great Powers 
since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) pp. 37–68, ignores Afghanistan and Khiva 
altogether. 
16 R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism 
(London: Macmillan, 1961) pp. 19–26. 
17 T.G. Otte, ‘Introduction: Personalities and Impersonal Forces in History’ in T.G. Otte and Constantine 
A. Pagedas (eds) Personalities, War and Diplomacy. Essays in International History (London: Frank Cass, 1997) 
pp. 8–9. 
18 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. x. 
19 Eric Stokes, ‘Bureaucracy and Ideology: Britain and India in the Nineteenth Century’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society Vol. 30 (1980) pp. 133–34. 
20 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism. Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914 (London: Longman, 
1993) pp. 42–52; Raymond Dumett ‘Introduction’ in Raymond E. Dumett (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and 
British Imperialism. The New Debate on Empire (London: Longman, 1999) pp. 10–11 raised a similar query. 
21 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 57; Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians’, pp. 622, 640–42. 
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The fact that British and Russian attitudes and decisions over Afghanistan and Khiva were so 
strikingly similar suggests that whatever the common factor in their decisions to expand into 
Central Asia was, it cannot have been wire-pulling by a new industrial bourgeoisie or a powerful 
class of gentlemanly financiers, as these did not exist in Russia. Dietrich Geyer’s pioneering study 
of the links between Russian domestic and foreign policy does not cover the period before 1860, 
but he concluded that even for the later period, when Russia had begun to industrialize, there is 
no evidence to suggest that economic interests played a role in the renewal of the advance into 
Central Asia after 1863: instead what mattered was the wider competition with Britain and a 
desire to restore prestige after defeat in the Crimean War.22 Equally, there is absolutely no 
evidence to suggest that British metropolitan financial or trade interests had any influence on the 
decision to invade Afghanistan, nor that they showed any desire to exploit it thereafter.  
On the British side, debates regarding the annexation of Afghanistan and the development of 
trade along the Indus certainly were informed by contemporary ideas of political economy, which 
so many East India Company officials of that generation had imbibed at Haileybury.23 While the 
Russians also referred piously to the importance of trade, officials of both states saw it primarily 
as an instrument of policy, a means of projecting power by non-military means, and in both cases 
they had only the vaguest idea of what the real prospects for trade in Central Asia actually were. 
Economic theories of imperial expansion are thus of little relevance here. Of much greater 
importance are questions of institutional, and in particular military-bureaucratic, culture; ‘Great 
Power’ prestige; personal ambition (for honours and promotion, rather than better investment 
returns); growing European prejudice against ‘barbarous Asiatics’; and the concomitant belief 
that they had the means and duty to spread ‘civilization’ in Asia. It is still sometimes argued even 
by Western scholars that Russian imperialism was qualitatively different from that of the West, 
owing to a sense of cultural and ethnic ‘kinship’ with Asians and a hybrid identity that lay mid-
way between Europe and Asia.24 In this interpretation Russia is held to be largely free of the 
original sin of European ‘Orientalism’ or of a profound sense of difference from the Asian 
‘other’.25 This is a questionable argument, not because Russian culture always sought to separate 
itself from the ‘Orient’, but because the crude binary opposition proposed by Edward Said was 
not always true of the British or French empires either.26 It is of little relevance to an 
understanding of Russian official attitudes or state ideology, where a strong sense of 
‘Europeanness’ and superiority to Asia predominated throughout most of the nineteenth 
 
22 Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914 (Leamington 
Spa: Berg, 1987) pp. 86–100. Local factors, of which Geyer was unaware, were also important, but these 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
23 Alexander Burnes, ‘On the Commerce of Shikarpur and Upper Scinde’, Transactions of the Bombay 
Geographical Society, Vol. II (1836–38) (Bombay: American Mission Press, 1844) pp. 315–19; see further Eric 
Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) pp. 52–53, 81–93; Hopkins, 
Modern Afghanistan, pp. 38–39. 
24 See, for instance, Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance. A Cultural History of Russia (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
2002) pp. 358–429; Mark Bassin, ‘Geographies of Imperial Identity’ in Lieven (ed.) Cambridge History of 
Russia Vol. 2, pp. 60–63. 
25 Nathaniel Knight, ‘Grigor’ev in Orenburg, 1851–1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?’, 
Slavic Review Vol. 59 No. 1 (2000) pp. 74–100; S.N. Abashin, ‘Osobennosti Rossiiskogo Orientalizma’ in 
S.N. Abashin, D.A. Arapov and N.A. Bekmakhanova, Tsentral’naya Aziya v Sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii 
(Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2008) pp. 332–33. 
26 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism. Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to 
the Emigration (Newhaven, Connecticut: Yale UP, 2010) p. 194. 
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century.27 Equally, that atavistic aggression, which Joseph Schumpeter identified as a legacy of 
aristocratic and absolutist continental imperialism in modern capitalist society, can in fact be just 
as well applied to the proconsuls of British India.28 These were all things that the British and the 
Russians had in common, and which helped to ensure that their default reaction to rumours of 
the other’s expansion was to respond in kind. 
The Persian siege of Herat  
The roots of the crises of 1839, as has been long acknowledged, lay in Persia. In 1813, and again 
in 1828, Russia decisively defeated Fateh ‘Ali Shah Qajar and annexed substantial territory in 
what is now Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the second of these victories, under the Treaty of 
Turkmanchai, Russia acquired a preponderant influence at the court of Tehran and established a 
permanent legation. The destruction of the Russian mission and the murder of Alexander 
Griboedov in 1829 were only a temporary setback to the growth of Russian power in Persia, 
since it was based on the presence of overwhelming military forces in Transcaucasia.29 These 
developments were viewed with growing alarm in London and Calcutta as a threat to Indian 
security, which had come to be seen as vital to sustaining Britain’s status as the world’s greatest 
power since the end of the Napoleonic wars.30 Muriel Atkin has argued that Russia’s two 
successful wars with Persia were the product of accident rather than design, and were certainly 
not originally intended to form part of a drive towards India.31 In June 1832, Count K.V. 
Nesselrode (1780–1862), the Russian foreign minister, wrote to the new Russian envoy to 
Tehran, Count I.O. Simonich (1792–1855), stating that he believed the British had acquiesced to 
the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai and that he did not foresee any serious political 
differences emerging between Britain and Russia in Persia.32 This judgement turned out to be 
overly sanguine. As Russian trade spread through Mazandaran and Persian Azerbaijan, and the 
Qajars increasingly seemed to be doing Russia’s bidding, disquiet continued to grow. By 1835, the 
surgeon to the British mission to Iran, Sir John McNeill (1795–1883), who would later become 
the official envoy, was convinced that by encouraging expansionist ambitions to the East (where 
Persia laid claim to sovereignty over the Afghan state of Herat) Russia was using Persia as a tool 
to threaten British India.33 In 1836, McNeill published an alarmist pamphlet, The Progress and 
 
27 Adeeb Khalid, Nathaniel Knight and Maria Todorova, ‘Ex Tempore—Orientalism’, Kritika Vol. 1 No. 4 
(Fall 2000), pp. 691–727. Vladimir Bobrovnikov, ‘Pochemu my marginaly? Zametki na poliakh russkogo 
perevoda “Orientalizma” Edwarda Saida’, Ab Imperio No. 2 (2008), pp. 325–44; Alexander Morrison, 
‘“Applied Orientalism” in British India and Tsarist Turkestan’, Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 
51 No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 619–47. 
28 Joseph Schumpeter, ‘Imperialism and Capitalism’ in Paul Sweezy (ed.) and Heinz Norden (trans.)  
Imperialism and Social Classes (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1951) pp. 83–85; Stokes, ‘Bureaucracy and Ideology’, pp. 
146–56; C.A. Bayly Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World 1780 –1830 (London: Longman, 1989) 
pp. 106–07, 194–95, 248–56. 
29 Laurence Kelly, Diplomacy and Murder in Tehran. Alexander Griboyedov and Imperial Russia’s Mission to the Shah 
of Persia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). 
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Present Position of Russia in the East, which did much to stimulate domestic Russophobia and had a 
considerable impact in the highest political circles.34 In 1837, his fears appeared to have been fully 
realized when Muhammad Shah Qajar launched a military expedition against Herat, seemingly 
encouraged and abetted by Simonich, who accompanied the troops and was present throughout 
much of what would be a lengthy siege, giving credence to the idea that it was conducted with 
Russian support. 
Debate has raged over whether Simonich exceeded his instructions from St Petersburg by 
encouraging the attack on Herat. Mikhail Volodarsky concludes that Nesselrode’s later assurances 
that Simonich had defied instructions from St Petersburg were a lie, while Malcolm Yapp writes 
that Simonich was not responsible for encouraging the assault, but that, in giving a Russian 
guarantee to a treaty in which Muhammad Shah took the rulers of Kandahar under Persian 
protection, he had exceeded his brief.35 Simonich was a slippery character, and a careful 
examination of his correspondence and of a self-justificatory memoir written in 1841 does not 
provide a completely decisive answer to this question: nevertheless, some things are clear. First, 
that the original initiative to attack Herat came from Muhammad Shah himself; secondly, that 
Russian support for it was not of long standing; thirdly, that it was designed to protect what the 
Russians considered to be their legitimate trade interests in Persia and Central Asia, and not as 
the prelude to an attack on India; and, fourthly, that Simonich became quite conscious that his 
behaviour was provoking British paranoia on this issue, and that this was something the Russians 
could and should exploit. 
The first assault on Herat in 1832–33 by ‘Abbas Mirza, the heir to the throne, whom the Russians 
and the British alike were hoping would succeed his ailing father, Fateh ‘Ali Shah, was certainly 
not encouraged by the Russians.36 Immediately after the withdrawal of Persian forces Simonich 
reported with dismay an interview at Zanjan with Khosro Mirza, ‘Abbas Mirza’s son, who stated 
that his father was planning to renew the attack: Simonich did his best to dissuade him, noting, 
‘The ease which they found last year appears to have turned their heads.’37 He added in a later 
despatch that he believed the expedition was a ploy by Fateh ‘Ali Shah to keep his son and his 
Khorasani troops away from the capital. K.K. Rodofinikin (1760–1838), the head of the Asiatic 
Department, agreed with Simonich that ‘Abbas Mirza’s projects of conquest in Afghanistan 
spelled disaster for Persia if his father were to die during his absence.38 Russian hopes for ‘Abbas 
Mirza were dashed after his death at Meshed in October 1833, and Simonich’s opposition to an 
attack on Herat seems to have been largely bound up with the prince’s fate.39 ‘Abbas Mirza’s 
death was followed shortly after by that of his father, Fateh ‘Ali Shah, and the British and the 
Russians briefly combined forces to ensure the smooth succession of a different heir, 
Muhammad Shah Qajar. The latter revived plans to seize Herat in 1836: Yapp writes that even 
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then Simonich was trying to discourage this, and that his subsequent decision to accompany the 
Persian forces was because he was anxious to bring a group of Russian deserters serving in the 
Persian army into custody.40 Simonich was initially sceptical, particularly when Muhammad Shah 
proposed leading the troops himself: this was partly because of the personal inconvenience he 
foresaw, and also because, at this stage, he thought the campaign had scant chance of success.41 
When later asking for permission to attend the siege, he did indeed state that this was because his 
personal intervention was needed to reassure the Russians in the Shah’s service that they would 
not be punished for desertion.42 However, his opinion rapidly changed once he saw how the 
British responded to the proposed Herat expedition. In April 1836 he wrote to Nesselrode that, 
‘If I take it so much to heart to see these projects succeed, it is precisely because the English are 
opposing them with all their means.’43 At this stage he claimed to be unaware of why the 
proposed invasion seemed to worry the British so much: six weeks later, in what was apparently a 
personal letter to Rodofinikin, he wrote: ‘Naturally I asked myself what reasons guide England in 
this minute surveillance of the military establishments of Persia... What are they afraid of? Their 
precarious situation in India.’ His claim that it was only in the previous few days that he had 
realized that this was the cause of English jumpiness was probably disingenuous, but, having 
prepared the ground with his superiors, he now offered this both as an example of how the 
English misjudged Russia, and also as a diplomatic opportunity to be exploited.44 In his later 
memoir he wrote that Persia had become a ‘spectre’ that robbed the London cabinet of rest, as 
they interpreted the simplest events as a putative attack on India.45 
However, Simonich’s satisfaction at having rattled the British rapidly turned to fear once he 
received confirmation of rumours that they had responded by sending an envoy to Afghanistan, 
and he melodramatically foresaw the complete eclipse of Russian power in Central Asia. 
Simonich argued for the creation of a powerful Afghan buffer state under Persian suzerainty and 
Russian protection to counter this threat, something he attempted to bring about himself by 
undertaking, on his own authority and initiative, to guarantee a treaty between Muhammad Shah 
and the Sardars of Kandahar.46 Simonich did not deny that he had exceeded his brief somewhat, 
but justified it in terms that reveal an overweening ambition and sense of self-importance: ‘[Any] 
minister of Russia, sought out on both sides, finding himself in such favourable circumstances, 
and able with the stroke of a pen to render his nation the arbiter of the Orient—would he not 
have profited from such a fine occasion? I gave the guarantee.’47 In August 1837 Simonich was 
removed from his post in Tehran, but it is not clear whether this was because St Petersburg 
thought he had been insubordinate or because Simonich himself was anxious to rejoin his wife 
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(the beautiful Princess Orbeliani) and their ten children in Tiflis.48 He was replaced by A.O. 
Duhamel (1801–1880), the former Russian envoy to Egypt. Contrary to Mosely’s suggestion, 
Duhamel does not appear to have been explicitly instructed to repudiate Simonich’s guarantee of 
the treaty with the Sardars of Kandahar.49 He did not arrive in Tehran until September 1838, and 
while still en route he sent repeated requests to Nesselrode asking for a decision on the matter, 
himself advocating further support for the Afghan ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad Khan, 
against British aggression. In December 1838 he wrote: 
… some sort of decision is no less urgent, indispensable, if we do not wish to lose the credit in 
which we currently rejoice in Asia... if after all this we today abandon the Barakzai brothers to the 
vengeance of their enemies, believe me, M. le Comte, that the Russian name will suffer a taint, 
which centuries will not suffice to efface, in the opinion of the peoples of Central Asia: a 
retrograde step will be considered as a sign of weakness.50  
This fear of being perceived as weak by ‘Asiatics’ was a recurring theme in all Russian thinking on 
Central Asia over the course of the nineteenth century, and here it was compounded by a fear 
that they were losing ground to the British. In 1839 it became clear that the British were going to 
invade Afghanistan, and at this stage the hollowness of Russia’s pretensions to be able to give 
direct assistance to Dost Muhammad were clearly revealed. Nesselrode chose to present this to 
the tsar as a case of Asiatic cunning and intrigue, writing that Simonich had been used as a tool 
by Dost Muhammad and the Sardars of Kandahar, and he launched a diplomatic rapprochement 
with Britain in an unsuccessful attempt to avert the invasion.51 The former envoy became the 
scapegoat, condemned for having provoked the British invasion of Afghanistan, which, until the 
disasters of 1842, the Russians believed to have been a success, permanently establishing British 
power in Central Asia to their detriment. Duhamel, carefully eliding his own earlier advocacy of 
Russian intervention in Afghanistan, wrote: 
In the expedition against Herat, the English believed they saw the beginning of projects long 
planned between Russia and Persia for the conquest of India... Unfortunately one cannot deny 
that the comments and all the conduct of Count Simonich was of the nature to give credit to this 
erroneous opinion.52 
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Simonich himself was unrepentant, and considered that a golden opportunity to knock back the 
British in Central Asia had been lost: ‘the fate of India was in our hands’.53 In fact, within a few 
months the Anglo-Sadozai regime in Kabul would fall, and the longer term significance of the 
British reaction to the siege of Herat would be clear—namely, that it was one of the factors that 
had caused them to overreach themselves disastrously in Afghanistan. 
The British and Russian missions to Afghanistan  
British policy on the Indian empire’s northwest frontier in this period has been the subject of 
exhaustive study over the last 50 years: Edward Ingram concluded that countering the Russian 
threat on a global scale was the paramount concern,54 and Yapp that significant disagreement 
existed between different ‘schools’ of frontier policy, but that they were more narrowly 
concerned with the defence of India itself. Most recently, as part of a (very welcome) attempt to 
escape the stranglehold which the so-called ‘Great Game’ has exercised on the Anglophone 
historiography of Central Asia and give local actors their proper due, Benjamin Hopkins has 
argued that the British were much more concerned with the potential threat from Ranjit Singh 
and the Sikh Khalsa—and with the power of rumour to destabilize their rule in India—than they 
were with the distant Russian menace.55 None of these arguments is wholly satisfactory, largely 
because to escape from the preoccupations found in British documents, as advocated by 
Hopkins, one needs to find alternative sources—either in Russian or Persian—which none of 
these authors has managed to do. The fact that the British feared that mere rumours of a Russian 
advance might be sufficient to threaten the East India Company, even without an actual invasion, 
was certainly the case and Hopkins’ suggestion that the emphasis on the Russian threat reflected 
a bureaucratic need for a recognizable and comprehensibly European opponent is intriguing (if, 
in my view, unproven, particularly given the British tendency to characterize the Russians as 
oriental and inscrutable). Although he is quite correct that various parties emphasized the Russian 
menace in official correspondence in order to push forward an expansionist agenda, the 
suggestion that this obscured a more profound fear of Ranjit Singh is less convincing: the 
evidence presented by Hopkins himself suggests that, while Sikh ambitions in Sind and towards 
Peshawar were a cause of concern, it was only after Ranjit Singh’s death in the summer of 1839 
that the Anglo-Indian leadership really began worrying about political instability in the Punjab 
and the danger posed by a leaderless Khalsa.56 Yapp has shown convincingly how, after some 
debate, by 1837 Lord Auckland (1784–1849), the governor-general, had decided that the East 
India Company’s alliance with the Sikh ruler was the key to British security. Nothing could be 
allowed to compromise this, least of all the interests of the amirs of Sind and the Barakzai rulers 
of Afghanistan, chief among whom (although it took a while for Auckland to realize this) was 
Dost Muhammad Khan at Kabul, who had deposed the Sadozai ruler Shah Shuja ul-Mulk in 
1809. Dost Muhammad deeply resented the seizing of Peshawar from his brother, Sultan Ahmad 
Khan, by the Sikhs in 1833, at a time when he had been distracted by an unsuccessful attempt by 
Shuja ul-Mulk to regain his throne (with, so the Barakzais suspected, covert British support).57 
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Dost Muhammad’s failure to obtain any kind of redress from the British at the time, together 
with the Persian threat to his western frontier, had prompted him to make approaches both to 
them and to the Russians.  
This was the political background to Captain Alexander Burnes’s (1805–1841) mission to Kabul 
in autumn 1837. Burnes was visiting Afghanistan for the second time, having passed through 
Kabul in 1831 on his celebrated journey to Bukhara, when he was accompanied by his Kashmiri 
secretary, Mohan Lal.58 He was not the first British ‘expert’ on Afghanistan: that distinction 
belonged to John Lewis, better known as Charles Masson, a deserter from the Company’s army 
who became a newswriter in Kabul and whose (unacknowledged) advice and assistance had been 
crucial to Burnes’s introduction to Kabuli society six years earlier.59 Burnes’s brief on this 
occasion was to resolve the dispute between the Afghans and the Sikhs, and to draw up a 
commercial treaty, but he rapidly exceeded his remit. The reappearance of a British agent at 
Kabul encouraged the amir to believe that some sort of restitution of Peshawar might be possible 
in return for an alliance with the British. This was also the policy advocated by Burnes himself, in 
direct contradiction of what he knew to be his superiors’ views and the ostensible purpose of his 
mission. In October 1837 he was already boasting to his friend Captain G.L. Jacob at Rajkot that 
he had abandoned commercial negotiations in favour of political intrigue, and was about to 
arrange an alliance with Dost Muhammad and a Sikh withdrawal from Peshawar in return for 
Afghan tribute.60  
Burnes would soon discover his error—the government of India had no intention of putting 
pressure on Ranjit Singh to withdraw from Peshawar, and Dost Muhammad had no intention of 
paying tribute to a non-Muslim ruler. All parties made severe misjudgements—Dost Muhammad 
had exaggerated expectations of what the British would offer, Burnes exaggerated the Russian 
threat and went far beyond what Calcutta was prepared to support, while Auckland 
misunderstood Dost Muhammad’s position, thinking that he feared further attacks from the 
Sikhs, and greatly overestimated the value of a British alliance to the Afghan ruler.61 
Three factors helped to raise the stakes in Afghanistan and convince the British that there was a 
real danger of Russian influence being established within a few hundred miles of their Indian 
frontier. The first, as we have seen, was the Persian attack on Herat in 1837. The second was the 
preparation of a punitive Russian expedition to Khiva, and the third was the dramatic arrival in 
Kabul of a Russian envoy, Captain Ivan Viktorovich Vitkevich (1809–1839) of the Orenburg 
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Cossacks, just a few weeks after Burnes. This prompted the latter to write to his brother-in-law, 
Major James Holland, in great excitement: 
 
We are in a mess here. Herat is besieged and may fall, and the Emperor of Russia has sent an 
envoy to Cabool to offer Dost Mahomed Khan money to fight Runjeet Singh!!!!! I could not 
believe my eyes or ears, but Captain Vickovitch [sic], for that is the agent’s name, arrived here 
with a blazing letter three feet long, and sent immediately to pay his respects to myself; I of 
course received him, and asked him to dinner.62 
In his official report to Lord Auckland, Burnes also referred to ‘This dazzling specimen of 
caligraphy [sic]’.63 The file on the Vitkevich mission in the Russian Imperial Foreign Policy 
Archive contains neither the original (which presumably remained with Dost Muhammad) nor 
even a copy of the text of this magnificent document, but judging from the translation (from 
Russian via Persian into English), which Burnes forwarded to Auckland, it was formal and fairly 
innocuous. The letter to Dost Muhammad from Simonich caused more misgivings, as he had 
written: ‘I hope that on his [Vitkevich’s] arrival at your Court you will treat him with 
consideration, and trust him with your secrets.’64 Although Burnes was initially suspicious of 
Vitkevich’s credentials, he subsequently wrote to Calcutta that he was sure that the envoy was 
who he professed to be and had full authority to negotiate at Kabul.65 Nevertheless there have 
been suggestions that Simonich exceeded his instructions in writing to Dost Muhammad, and 
that Vitkevich’s mission was unauthorized. Given how large this mission has tended to loom in 
British accounts of the origins of the First Afghan War as evidence of the reality of the Russian 
threat, it requires more detailed examination from a Russian perspective.  
In a statement to the Asiatic committee in May 1835, Nesselrode had attempted to lay out the 
correct response to the emissaries Russia had been receiving from India and Afghanistan 
requesting assistance in fighting off English aggression. While acknowledging the benefits that 
would accrue were Russia to extend friendly trade relations in the region, Nesselrode added that: 
‘entering into relations with Afghanistan and India must be done with care and extreme 
circumspection, in order not to excite the habitual distrust of foreigners, and in particular the 
English Government’.66 Although exchanges of presents and trade agreements could be 
authorized, there could be no guarantees of protection or support. In May 1836 this policy was 
tested by the arrival in Orenburg of Hussain ‘Ali, an envoy from Dost Muhammad Khan, 
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accompanied by Vitkevich, who had met him while on a mission to Bukhara. Hussein ‘Ali bore 
letters to the tsar and the governor of Orenburg, V.A. Perovsky (1794–1857) which appealed to 
Russia to grant him the same degree of support as that which the Persian government now 
enjoyed, to enable him to counter the Sadozais, the Sikhs, and the British.67 Perovsky was the 
central figure in Russian policy towards Central Asia in the first half of the nineteenth century: 
the illegitimate (but acknowledged) son of one of Russia’s greatest magnates, Count A.K. 
Razumovsky, he was a hero of the Napoleonic Wars (where he had been wounded at Borodino) 
and was ennobled in his own right by Alexander I. He had a close personal relationship with 
Nicholas I, whom he had accompanied on his educational tours around Russia and Europe 
before his accession, and whom he had personally protected on St Isaac’s Square during the 
Decembrist Revolt.68 As such, his views carried considerable weight in St Petersburg, and he did 
not doubt that this represented a golden opportunity to halt what appeared an unstoppable 
English advance in Central Asia:  
If Shah Shuja ul-Mulk seizes Afghanistan then the country will be entirely subject to the East 
India Company and the English will be left just a step away from Bukhara itself—and all Central 
Asia will be in their hands. Our Asian trade will collapse and... the English will encourage the 
neighbouring Asian lands against us and will supply them with munitions, weapons and money, 
and this is all that is wanting to transform our negligible opponents into dangerous foes… The 
English maintain their devotees, or those whom they have bought, not only in Kabul, but even in 
Bukhara itself. They act against us; use every circumstance in order to harm us and our trade, and 
in order to oppose them it is necessary to pay in the same kind of coin.69 
Rodofinikin, the head of the Asiatic Department, was not quite so eager to embroil Russia in the 
affairs of Kabul. He expressed doubts about Hussain ‘Ali’s credentials, citing two previous 
envoys from Dost Muhammad and a bogus envoy from Lucknow called Kafayet Khan who had 
turned up in Tiflis the year before, escorted by Simonich, who accepted his bona fides, but whom 
Rodofinikin claimed had been sent by the English as a spy.70 What also troubled him was that 
Hussain ‘Ali had been in Russia before, when he accompanied a refugee Sadozai prince called 
Shahzada Farrukh to Orenburg, a circumstance Rodofinikin thought rather suspicious:71 ‘he 
seems to us rather strange and wonderful: how can the Khan of Kabul [sic] have decided to send 
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translation to Calcutta: PP Vol. XXV.7 No. 1 (8 June 1859) p. 85. 
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him to Russia, when he could not have been unaware that he had visited us before with a prince 
of that very dynasty which he overthrew?’72 Rodofinikin also thought the tone of the letters 
unusually subservient for an Asiatic monarch. Perovsky disagreed, insisting that the letters from 
Dost Muhammad were genuine, and that he had probably chosen Hussain ‘Ali because of his 
previous familiarity with the Russians, while the subservient tone reflected the immense pressure 
the amir was under. In this, as in most other aspects of the Afghan mission, Perovsky’s views 
prevailed. Hussain ‘Ali was granted a passport and allowed to proceed to St Petersburg, where 
Rodofinikin interviewed him personally.73 He would be accompanied by the same young, newly 
promoted Cossack officer who had brought him to Orenburg from Bukhara, an exiled Polish 
nobleman called Jan Prosper Witkiewicz (Russified to Ivan Vitkevich) who had become 
Perovsky’s unlikely protégé. 
Vitkevich is an intriguing, enigmatic figure. He was exiled from Vilna in 1822 at the age of 14, 
together with five schoolmates from the gymnasium, one of whom, Peslyak, later recorded his 
experiences in a short memoir (which, together with the reminiscences of the military 
topographer I.F. Blaramberg, constitutes our principal source for his biography). Their crime was 
membership of a ‘revolutionary-national’ organization called the ‘Black Brothers’: two of the 
other accused were sentenced to death, and although this was commuted to imprisonment, one 
died mad in gaol. Vitkevich was sent to serve as a private soldier in Orsk, and the remaining three 
to different steppe fortresses. Here they were placed under harsh military discipline and 
forbidden to write letters, even to their families.74 Where Peslyak sought solace in natural history, 
teaching children how to read, giving dancing classes, and learning how to make shoes and boots, 
Vitkevich devoted himself to learning oriental languages and understanding the steppe culture 
that surrounded him. In 1829 he had a well-known encounter with the German natural 
philosopher Alexander von Humboldt, at that time carrying out geographical researches for the 
Russian government, who was amazed to find a complete collection of his works in the young 
soldier’s quarters, and to whom Vitkevich is supposed to have confided a plan to escape from 
Orenburg across the steppe to India. Notwithstanding this apparent indiscretion, under 
Governor Sukhtelen, Vitkevich was promoted to officer cadet and appointed a translator with 
the Orenburg frontier commission. He seems to have attracted Perovsky’s attention immediately 
after the latter took up his post as governor of Orenburg in 1833: soon Vitkevich had been 
commissioned as an ensign and sent on a mission to Bukhara, from which he returned with 
accurate information and maps of his route which apparently earned him an audience with the 
tsar.75 It was unsurprising then that Perovsky wrote to Nesselrode in 1836 to say that Vitkevich 
had more than made up for his youthful political mistakes at the Vilna gymnasium, and that he 
would be the ideal person to accompany the Afghan ambassador and act as his translator, first in 
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St Petersburg, and then on the return journey to Kabul via Persia.76 However, Hussain ‘Ali fell ill 
in Moscow, and although he eventually reached Tiflis and was sent on from there by Baron 
Rozen to Tabriz and Tehran, he does not appear to have reached Afghanistan.77 Vitkevich 
instead took charge of the tsar’s official letter to Dost Muhammad, and Nesselrode authorized 
him to continue alone to the Caucasus (where he met Blaramberg, who accompanied him as far 
as Tabriz) and then on through Persia to Kabul.78 His instructions from Nesselrode indicated that 
it would be up to Simonich to decide whether to send him on to Kabul or not, depending on the 
political situation. If he were to carry on, then he was to urge the Afghan rulers of Kabul and 
Kandahar to unite in a strong confederation to resist the British, but without making any offer of 
direct assistance.79 He was also told to try to reach a trade agreement, to encourage Afghan 
merchants to travel to the great fair at Nizhny Novgorod, and to gather as much information as 
possible about Afghanistan and the relations of its rulers with the British. In Tehran he met 
Simonich and may have received further, verbal instructions from him: Simonich himself later 
claimed that he had simply repeated St Petersburg’s orders, although, had he told Vitkevich to 
give assurances of Russian military support, he would have been unlikely to admit it.80 From 
Tehran Vitkevich proceeded first to the royal encampment at Herat, where he had an audience 
with Muhammad Shah, before continuing to Kandahar and Kabul, where his appearance so 
startled Burnes.81 
Hereafter Vitkevich’s story is incomplete, as the documents relating to his embassy to 
Afghanistan include only the most formal communications from him concerning his 
whereabouts, together with inaccurate reports that he had left Afghanistan for Khiva and been 
killed there (in fact, he returned safely to the Russian encampment at Herat in June 1838, 
accompanied by the son of one of the rulers of Kandahar).82 On 9 May 1839, shortly after 
returning to St Petersburg, Vitkevich shot himself in his room at the Hotel ‘Parizh’, having first 
supposedly burned all the notes and materials he had brought back with him from Afghanistan.83 
As L.G. Senyavin (1805–1861), the new director of the Asiatic Department, noted in a personal 
letter to Perovsky shortly afterwards: ‘In a word, with him perished all the information about 
Afghanistan which would now be particularly precious and useful to us. Only what he managed 
to relate to me about it is known.’84 As it is, the file on Vitkevich’s mission contains just four 
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personal letters, all written to Vitkevich while he was in Kabul. Three were from V.I. Dal’ (1801–
1872), Perovsky’s secretary and later Russia’s greatest lexicographer, who within a year would be 
accompanying the force marching on Khiva.85 Dal’ had kept Vitkevich abreast of events in the 
steppe, taking advantage of their shared skill in Oriental languages to write most place names in 
the Arabic script.86  
Vitkevich and Dal’ had become close friends after the latter’s posting to Orenburg in 1833, and 
Vitkevich wrote to him from the time of his departure with Hussain ‘Ali to St Petersburg in 
August 1836 until he left Tehran for Kandahar in September 1837 on what he described as his 
‘labours of Hercules’ (Gerkulesovskiya trudy). The letters reveal a wry sense of humour, and 
impatience at the length of his superiors’ deliberations as he waited with Hussain ‘Ali in St 
Petersburg in the summer of 1836. He refers to the British as ‘artful’ (khitrosplemmenyi), but the 
context was a whimsical passage in which he asked why they had not yet built a ‘self-flyer’ (samolet 
—the word that would eventually become the Russian for ‘aeroplane’) which would have allowed 
him a better view of the Caucasus. He reflected little on the political implications of his mission, 
writing only that he felt amply rewarded for it by the adventures he had already had and the new 
sights he had seen.87  
The only other surviving materials from Vitkevich’s Afghan mission appear to be a series of brief 
descriptions of the routes from Persia to Afghanistan compiled by him en route to Kabul, which 
were published in 1853 by Blaramberg, who claimed he had obtained them from Vitkevich’s 
travelling companion, one ‘Abduwahhab. Intriguingly, Blaramberg also referred to 
‘Abduwahhab’s own account of the journey, written in Persian, which, if it ever comes to light, 
might shed more light on Vitkevich’s character and activities.88 In its absence, however, we are 
little closer to understanding the man or why he shot himself. One explanation, which later 
reached the British via their letter-writer at Bokhara, was that Vitkevich felt humiliated because St 
Petersburg had repudiated the offers of support he had made to Dost Muhammad Khan.89  
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Although this and similar rumours from British sources have been uncritically repeated since as 
evidence of a ‘disavowal’ of Vitkevich’s mission that led to his suicide,90 this is unlikely, partly 
because he had only just returned to Russia and had not even submitted a full report, but 
primarily because there is every indication that the authorities in St Petersburg were extremely 
pleased with the outcome of his mission. Vitkevich had returned to Tehran in March 1839, where 
Muhammad Shah Qajar awarded him the order of the Lion and the Sun, with St Petersburg’s 
approval.91 He reached St Petersburg in May, where he was given a preliminary, congratulatory 
debriefing by Senyavin, who pronounced himself baffled by his subsequent suicide, writing to 
Perovsky that in the eight days since his arrival in St Petersburg Vitkevich had seemed in 
excellent spirits, and that he was about to be transferred to the Guards, together with other signs 
of imperial approval: 
On the eve of his suicide they say that they saw him again in the middle of the day, and again he 
was merry; in the evening he said farewell to Simonich and returned from there, and, locking 
himself in his room as usual, asked to be roused the next day at 9, and then shot himself. […] All 
this demonstrates that the Polish jig in him overflowed [sic]. It is strange that it did not occur to 
him to go to Orenburg, or even on the scientific expedition [a reference to the Khiva expedition], 
given that he himself said many times, that he was accustomed to a vagabond life and couldn’t 
stay in one place.92 
Vitkevich’s suicide note gave no clues (assuming its reliability). He made no mention of his 
mother, brother or friends, and simply stated that he was taking his life of his own accord and 
gave details of various debts that were to be settled.93 It is always possible that, as Sir John Kaye 
later alleged, he was murdered or driven to suicide, and that Senyavin, in this letter to his 
principal patron, was somehow seeking to disguise this, but this seems implausible and 
melodramatic, reflecting little more than British prejudices about the nature of the Russian state.94 
Rather than looking to the outcome of his Afghan mission, as Senyavin’s rather chilling reference 
to the ‘Polish jig’ (Pol’skaya zhiga v nem razlilos’) suggests, we should instead seek the reason in his 
experiences as an exile. At least one of Vitkevich’s fellow exiles became so depressed that he shot 
himself, and Peslyak wrote that he also came very close to it. Blaramberg writes that, in contrast 
to the playful letters he wrote to Dal’ at this time, Vitkevich appeared permanently melancholy 
when they were travelling together from Tiflis to Tabriz, saying that he was fed up with life, and 
brandishing a pistol before him with the words: ‘Avec се pistolet la, je me brulerai un jour la 
cervelle.’95 The reason for his suicide probably lies in the trauma of youthful exile and separation 
from his family, and perhaps a sudden surge of self-loathing and disgust at having served so well 
the state that had inflicted this on him.96 Suicide in early nineteenth-century Russia was often an 
overtly political act, an ultimate assertion of the autonomy of the individual in the face of 
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autocratic power, and this is another possible reading of Vitkevich’s death, although not 
necessarily the one he intended.97 What is more certain is that Vitkevich’s melancholy fate 
contributed to the aura of mystery that he had acquired among the British, and lent credence to 
rumours of the sinister nature of Russian intrigue in Afghanistan.98 
The official nature of Vitkevich’s mission is not in doubt, but it is less clear what he had been 
authorized to offer—his written instructions were vague and the letter he carried contained little 
more than expressions of friendship and hopes for the establishment of trade relations, but while 
in Kabul he seems to have offered more, including financial assistance in the struggle against the 
British and the Sikhs.99 To the extent that he was ‘Perovsky’s man’, he probably had the governor 
of Orenburg’s authority to offer a degree of Russian financial support, and Volodarsky argues 
convincingly that, in this, Perovsky and the tsar had overridden objections from the more 
cautious Nesselrode.100 Vitkevich’s presence was certainly designed to strengthen Dost 
Muhammad’s resolve to resist British blandishments, creating in Afghanistan a barrier to the 
further encroachment (as the Russians saw it) of British trade and political interests into Central 
Asia. Almost a mirror image, in other words, of what the British were simultaneously trying to 
achieve in Afghanistan, but not a direct attempt to threaten British security in India. The British 
response—an outright invasion and occupation of Afghanistan—was disproportionate to the 
threat posed by Vitkevich and his mission. The Persian attack on Herat was a more concrete 
threat to India’s security, but even as preparations for the deposition of Dost Muhammad were 
being put in place, Auckland received news that the siege had failed, partly owing to the efforts of 
a British officer, Eldred Pottinger, in strengthening Herat’s defences. Nevertheless, Auckland 
insisted that the operation must go ahead ‘to raise up a permanent barrier against schemes of 
aggression from that quarter’.101 The fear of an extension of Russian influence into Central Asia 
continued to drive British policy.  
It was Burnes who, partly as a means of exaggerating the importance of his mission, talked up the 
Russian threat (‘a cabinet, Oriental and dark in its diplomacy’102), and who gradually, with McNeill 
in Tehran, and the foreign member of the Governor-General’s Council, William Hay 
Macnaghten (1793–1841), won over the more cautious Auckland to the necessity of pursuing an 
aggressive policy in Afghanistan. Burnes would reiterate this position in his last despatch from 
Afghanistan, sent from Jalalabad on the road back to Punjab, stating that ‘consequences of a 
most serious nature’ would flow from the situation in Central Asia unless the British government 
 
97 Susan Morrissey, ‘In the Name of Freedom: Suicide, Serfdom and Autocracy in Russia’, Slavonic and East 
European Review Vol. 82 No. 2 (April 2004) pp. 271–78, 290–91. 
98 This was partly because they had so little accurate information about him. See, for instance, Stoddart to 
Burnes, 9 February 1838, PP Vol. XXV.7 No. 1 (8 June 1859) p. 169, where he refuses to believe that 
Vitkevich could be a Pole, because he was in a Cossack regiment. 
99 Yapp, Strategies, pp. 234–35; Mosely, ‘Russian Policy in Asia’, p. 671. Blaramberg’s later assertion that 
Vitkevich’s mission was not ‘political’ was almost certainly disingenuous: Vospominaniya, pp. 129–30. 
100 Volodarsky, ‘The Russians in Afghanistan’, p. 73. 
101 Auckland to the Secret Committee, 13 March 1839, ‘East India (Cabul and Affghanistan). 
Correspondence of the Governor General of India with the President of the Board of Control and with 
the Secret Committee of the East India Company […] relative to the expedition to Affghanistan, or such 
part thereof as has not already been published’ PP Vol. XXV.7 No. 1 (8 June 1859) p. 303; Hopkins is thus 
wrong to suggest that ‘the Russians’ (sic) were still besieging Herat once Shah Shuja had been installed: 
Afghanistan, p. 66. 
102 Burnes to Auckland, 23 December 1837, PP Vol. XXV.7 No. 1 (8 June 1859) p. 92; this phrase, so 
redolent of British prejudices about Russia, was not published in the original, ‘garbled’ papers of 1839. 
20 A. Morrison ‘Twin Imperial Disasters. The invasions of Khiva and Afghanistan in the Russian and British 
official mind, 1839 – 1842’ Modern Asian Studies Vol.48 No.1 (2014) pp.253 - 300 
‘applies a prompt, active and decided counteraction’ to the machinations of Russia, ‘a nation 
which makes no scruple to dazzle men’s minds by promises’.103 Burnes’s solution to this problem, 
as is well known, was the creation of a strong, unified Afghan state able to resist Persian and 
Russian aggression, and he exceeded his instructions by promising British arms and money to 
Dost Muhammad Khan’s brothers at Kandahar to resist the Persians. For this he was rebuked by 
Auckland, who feared that the creation of a more powerful Afghan state on British India’s 
frontiers might become a threat in itself, and would certainly be viewed unfavourably by Britain’s 
oldest and most important ally in the region, Ranjit Singh. At this stage Auckland professed to 
attach ‘little importance’ to the arrival of a Russian agent in Kabul, but later revised this 
opinion.104 Auckland would eventually write to the Court of Directors that, although he had no 
objection in principle to the tsar’s original letter to Dost Muhammad, he viewed Simonich’s role 
with much greater suspicion.105 
A month later Burnes wrote: ‘I am at Simla with the Governor General, who has determined to 
place Shah Shooja on the throne in the cold weather’ and suggested that Vitkevich’s presence at 
Kabul had proved crucial in reaching this decision.106 Yapp has shown how rapidly—and with 
how little consideration—what was originally supposed to be an arm’s-length mission mounted 
by the Sikhs in support of Shuja’s restoration evolved into the re-creation of Afghanistan as a 
fully fledged buffer state under British control, the cornerstone of a new system of imperial 
defence. Auckland would later claim that Dost Muhammad had already made up his mind to ally 
himself with the Russians and Persians as early as November 1837, but there is no evidence for 
this—and Burnes’s negotiations suggest the contrary. It was an ex post facto justification for the 
aggressive policy Auckland had decided to embark upon early in 1838. Auckland believed that 
Shuja’s ‘legitimacy’ as the representative of the senior branch of the Durrani dynasty would lead 
the Afghans to welcome his return and the ousting of the ‘usurper’, Dost Muhammad. 
Subsequent events would show that Auckland had overestimated Shah Shuja’s popularity in 
Afghanistan, something that became obvious within weeks of the Sadozai ruler’s restoration. 
Nevertheless the conviction persisted that the blood descent of a ruler counted for more with 
‘Asiatics’ than his popularity or competence, and that the hierarchical nature of Afghan society 
meant that simply replacing one ruler with another would be sufficient to establish British 
control.  
Thus crucial decisions over Afghan policy were taken on the basis of faulty intelligence and an 
exaggerated fear of Russia by a small group of officials in India, albeit within parameters set by 
London where, at that particular juncture, Palmerston was quite happy to see Russia thus 
baulked.107 By the middle of 1839 the British also had another justification for advancing beyond 
the Indus—long-standing rumours that the Russians were planning an invasion of Khiva had 
been confirmed. This caused concern, not because the British thought it a prelude to an invasion 
of India or Afghanistan, but because it would create unrest and rumour in India itself, and make 
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the Russian alternative to British patronage in Central Asia seem all the more attractive. As 
Auckland wrote a year later, by which time (although the British did not yet know this) the last 
remnants of Perovsky’s frostbitten and scurvy-ridden troops were staggering back into Orenburg: 
I have no great fear that the Cossack and the Sepoy will shortly meet on the Oxus, nor do I 
apprehend that overwhelming armies will be poured down the Volga from Russia into Turkistan 
[...] but I look to effects from the occupation of Khiva by the Russians, in the maintenance of 
irritation and division, and in the notion which will be created that there are two standards, under 
either of which the turbulent of all these States may range themselves.108 
The genesis of the Khiva expedition 
If the British invasion of Afghanistan—which was widely reviled even at the time as an 
unprovoked attack on a neighbouring ruler—seemed to come out of the blue, the Russian 
invasion of Khiva was generally seen as justified by substantial grievances. The Russians could 
point to Khivan raids on caravan traffic and repeated attempts to extract revenue from nomadic 
groups over whom the Russians claimed sovereignty. The more historically minded could also 
invoke the massacre of Prince Bekovitch-Cherkassky’s expedition in 1717, or the supposed 
‘political testament’ of Peter the Great, which called for the subjugation of Khiva.109 Above all, as 
Madhavan Palat has suggested, the presence of what were variously estimated as hundreds or 
thousands of Russian slaves in the Khanate, captured by Kazakh or Turkmen raiders along the 
Orenburg line and the Caspian coast, played a crucial role in legitimating and motivating the 
Russian advance. This was despite the fact that the number of Russian slaves was grossly 
exaggerated (in fact, most of the Khanate’s slaves were Shia Persians), that Russia itself was 
engaged in slave trafficking in the Caucasus in the same period, and that many of the ‘slaves’ were 
in fact prisoners of war.110 The effectiveness of these complaints in a diplomatic sphere 
dominated by the rhetoric of anti-slavery can be seen in the government of India’s 
acknowledgment that it was a legitimate justification for a punitive expedition, even though it 
feared that a permanent Russian presence in Khiva might be damaging to Indian security.111 What 
gave these reasons for attacking Khiva force and urgency within Russia was the new, self-
conscious sense among the administrative and military elite that they were the servants of a 
European ‘Great Power’ with prestige and standards to maintain, a tendency Michael 
Khodarkovsky identified on the steppe frontier as early as the 1750s (where it took the form of a 
mission civilizatrice), and which reached its apotheosis in 1814, when Alexander I marched into 
Paris.112   
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The attack on Khiva had a lengthy genesis: in 1804 Prince G.S. Volkonsky, the governor of 
Orenburg, proposed a punitive expedition to Alexander I, although at that time there were other 
pressing foreign policy priorities. In 1819 Captain N.N. Murav’ev was despatched on a mission to 
Khiva from Tiflis, and succeeded not only in traversing the Turkmen country to reach the 
Khivan oasis, but also, more remarkably, in returning alive, but without procuring any lasting 
agreement or securing the release of any slaves.113 In 1831 the head of the Orenburg Frontier 
Commission, General G.F. Gens, wrote a strongly worded memorandum on the plight of the 
Russian prisoners in Khiva, which in 1833 prompted Nesselrode to acknowledge that an 
expedition ought to be sent to free them, although he was concerned about the cost and the 
difficulties of the route.114 Thus there was agreement in principle to some sort of punitive 
expedition even before Perovsky’s arrival in Orenburg, although its feasibility had yet to be 
established. As Zakhar’in recounted it, on taking up his post in 1833 on the death of Governor 
Sukhtelen, Perovsky was shocked to discover that Kazakhs around the Ural River, while 
nominally acknowledging Russian sovereignty, were still in the habit of capturing Russian 
subjects and selling them into slavery in Khiva. One particularly affecting tale concerned a 
Cossack officer’s widow who was kidnapped from Orenburg itself in 1825, on the eve of the first 
visit to the town by Alexander I. Thanks to the latter’s intervention she was eventually found and 
brought back, but even the autocrat of all the Russias had been forced to offer a large sum to her 
captors.115 Whether this story is true or not, Perovsky clearly felt a strong, almost personal, sense 
of affront and moral outrage at Khiva’s enslavement of Russians. In 1834 he asked the Orenburg 
Frontier Commission to prepare a list of known Russian prisoners held in Khiva, which 
eventually amounted to 599 names.116 Early the following year he sent a melodramatic 
memorandum to St Petersburg, advocating a punitive expedition and invoking the common 
‘civilizing’ mission of the European powers in the Muslim world: 
The guilt of the Dey of Algiers against the King of the French pales into insignificance in 
comparison with the crimes carried out by whole generations of Khivan Khans against the 
Emperors of Russia […] there a single, momentary, and in reality bloodless insult to the Consul; 
here in the course of a whole century constantly accumulating perfidy which increases day by day, 
deliberate malice, robbery, banditry and disrespectful abuse of Majesty; here the blood of 
Russians is spilled, has been flowing for a whole century […] thousands have suffered and suffer 
now under the yoke of slavery […] France demanded millions for the conquest of Algeria, and 
has retained for all time her conquests beyond the restitution of what she has spent. For Russia 
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the conquest of Khiva would not cost one tenth of this; but all of Central Asia would be revived, 
would rise up from its torpor with the introduction of an educated, beneficial government.117  
The sense of competitive imperial emulation emerges clearly: Russia could not be left behind by 
Britain and France, nor could one of Europe’s Great Powers continue to tolerate the insults of a 
petty Asiatic state like Khiva. The response from the war minister, A.I. Chernyshev (1786–1857), 
was enthusiastic: he wrote that the tsar was entirely in agreement with the memorandum’s 
sentiments and wished to see a detailed plan for an expedition; once again, Perovsky’s close 
personal connection with Nicholas I had borne fruit.118 The first practical consequence of this 
was an imperial decree of 1836 ordering the detention of over 350 Khivan merchants in the 
menovoi dvor (Asian caravanserai) outside Orenburg and a total suspension of Russian trade with 
the Khanate.119 Military preparations were temporarily postponed owing to a rebellion among the 
Kazakhs, and to what the Khan of Khiva would later describe to James Abbott as genuine efforts 
to reach a diplomatic settlement by freeing some of the Russian slaves.120 Ivanin wrote that the 
Russians simply saw these as delaying tactics, possibly inspired by British interference.121 
Perovsky himself, while paying lip-service to the idea that the trade embargo might be used to 
bring Khiva to the negotiating table, made it clear that nothing less than the immediate release of 
what he claimed were 3,000 Russian prisoners in the Khanate would do: ‘the Khivans meet their 
guests with knives, poison or the shackles of a prisoner’.122 In practice he was not prepared to 
negotiate: when two Khivan envoys arrived with five freed Russian prisoners in August 1838 
Perovsky refused to receive them, had them detained with the merchants, and interrogated the 
ex-slaves for useful information.123 In March 1839 the special committee, consisting of Perovsky 
himself, Nesselrode and Chernyshev,  which met to consider Perovsky’s proposal for a military 
expedition added a further consideration: 
… beyond its stated principal aim, it must have another, still more important: to establish and 
consolidate the influence of Russia in Central Asia, weaken the long-standing impunity of the 
Khivans, and especially that constancy with which the English government, to the detriment of 
our industry and trade, strives to spread its supremacy in those parts. [...] however, bringing into 
consideration the current state of affairs in Central Asia, we consider it more convenient to 
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postpone the mission to Khiva until the end of the expedition undertaken by the Governor-
General of the British possessions in India against the ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad.124 
In other words, while the Khiva expedition would hopefully combat British influence by reviving 
both Russia’s trade and her prestige in Central Asia, they were anxious to avoid an open clash. 
The committee added that alluding to the Afghan example would be a sufficient response to any 
British complaints, but it would be better to wait until the outcome there had been decided. In 
April 1840, Nesselrode wrote to Perovsky to let him know the substance of what had passed 
between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the British government, which evidently regarded the 
Khivan expedition with suspicion, seeing it as a response to their invasion of Afghanistan and an 
attempt to meddle with its affairs. Nesselrode claimed to have dispelled these fears by explaining 
Russia’s grievances against Khiva and categorically denying that the expedition had anything to 
do with the invasion of Afghanistan.125  
Nevertheless, the committee also cited Afghanistan when it came to the expedition’s aims, one of 
which would be to depose the khan of Khiva, Allah Quli, and replace him with a Russian client: 
‘this measure, which is not against the customs of the asiatics, would be entirely consistent with 
the actions of the British in their current expedition against Dost Muhammad Khan, the declared 
purpose of which [...] lies in the deposition of its ruler and the restoration of its former Shah, 
Shuja ul-Mulk’.126 However the proposed candidate, Sultan Bai Muhammad Aichuvakov, head of 
the western section of the Orenburg Kazakhs, wisely turned down the opportunity to become 
the Russian Shah Shuja (although he would later accompany the expedition). Instead Perovsky 
proposed replacing Allah Quli with his younger brother, Rahman Quli Inaq, who was rumoured 
to be ‘a very reasonable man, and, so far as is known, secretly wishes the friendship and 
patronage of Russia’.127 There was no indication of where this information had come from, or 
indeed of whether the Khan’s brother had been made aware of the honour in store for him. The 
Russians did not even know his name, referring to him simply as ‘Inaq’, which was not a name 
but a title conventionally bestowed on the younger brother of the khan.128 Richmond Shakespear, 
who met Rahman Quli at Hazarasp in 1840, certainly had no inkling that he was under 
consideration as a potential Russian ally.129 Despite this, Nesselrode endorsed the proposal, 
reiterating that by preserving the same dynasty in power it would be agreeable to the 
understanding of ‘Asiatics’, and again pointed to parallels with British policy in Kabul.130 Any 
further details seem to have become swamped in the sheer logistical complexity of sending a 
military force into the barren steppe in winter, and the plans for Khiva’s future government in 
the event of the expedition’s success remained vague until its departure. One of the few 
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indications that any thought had been given to this was a small (and as it turned out, very 
premature) pamphlet published in 1840 which contained wildly inaccurate claims about the 
wealth and resources of Khiva which would accrue to Russia after its conquest.131 
Because the Khivan expedition was halted by the weather, Perovsky was later able to claim that it 
remained militarily undefeated. The political and military planning and intelligence behind the 
expedition received far less scrutiny than that of the British in Afghanistan, where European 
troops had been very publicly worsted by supposedly ‘savage’ tribesmen. Instead the Russians 
emphasized the one engagement they had with the enemy, when a small detachment under 
Captain Erofeev easily defeated a group of Khivan raiders: in his address to the troops on 
announcing the decision to retreat, Perovsky made great play of the ‘contemptible’ and ‘cowardly’ 
nature of the enemy with which the Russians had failed to come to grips.132 Although the Russian 
force was indeed almost certainly superior to anything Allah Quli could have put in the field, it 
was still small and it seems likely that even if the weather had been more favourable, it would 
have been exhausted and in severe need of supplies by the time it reached the cultivated lands of 
the Khanate.  
If James Abbott’s account is to be believed, Allah Quli Khan was well aware of the size of the 
advancing force (4,000 to 5,000 men) and of the fact that by January 1840 they were stuck fast in 
the snow.133 Even if other rumours had not reached him before, the khan would have been 
alerted to the preparation of the expeditionary force when the lengthy and complicated process 
of assembling the 10,000 camels required for transport began in August 1838.134 At this stage the 
cover for the preparations remained a ‘scientific expedition’, but given the prodigious numbers 
involved, this soon wore rather thin: Ivanin described how already in March 1839 the female 
traders of the Orenburg bazaar knew that an expedition against Khiva was being prepared, while 
‘false’ rumours about Russian movements were circulating in the Steppe.135  
By May 1839 the Kazakhs clearly knew that a military expedition was being prepared, as the Biis 
(judges) of the Nazarov division wrote to General Gens expressing their relief on learning that it 
was not intended to chastise them: ‘it is not unknown to your Excellency that our people were 
afraid of the force which you are sending out, not knowing the reason’—Gens, however, refused 
the request to be told the route the expedition would take.136 Rumours of these preparations 
spread far ahead, as Alexander Burnes had already heard of them in garbled form from his agent 
in Bukhara in October 1839.137 Allah Quli thus had ample warning of the Russian advance and 
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had made preparations to resist it.138 After the expedition’s failure, the commander of the Novo-
Alexandrovsk fortress sent in a proclamation in ‘Tatar’ that a spy had brought him, which bore 
the khan of Khiva’s seal, and which urged Kazakh and Turkmen Biis and Batyrs (heroes) to join 
him in fighting against the Russians.139  
Perovsky’s scheme to depose a khan who seems to have been a fairly popular ruler was based, as 
in the case of Auckland’s removal of Dost Muhammad, on a mixture of prejudice and poor (or 
non-existent) intelligence. If at first sight the Russians appeared to have a stronger case for 
invading Khiva than the British had had in Afghanistan, their specific grievances against Allah 
Quli Khan were only part of the story. Like the British, they saw their invasion as a means of 
countering a threat from another great power in Asia and, like the British, they had devised an ill-
thought-out scheme to impose a ruler of their choice on a neighbouring state, in the expectation 
that, as ‘Asiatics’, the population would simply submit. Both powers also indulged in dubious 
legal justifications for their acts of aggression—the British by claiming that Dost Muhammad was 
a usurper, while Ivanin later asserted that in the eighteenth century the Khivans had chosen five 
Khans in succession who were ‘Russian subjects’ by virtue of being ‘Kirgiz’ (Kazakh), and that 
therefore Russia had an ‘indisputable claim’ to sovereignty over Khiva.140 However, the political 
failings of the Russian plans for Khiva were never revealed as starkly as those of the British 
occupation of Afghanistan, because the Russian forces never reached their destination.  
Ignoring the ‘native’ voice  
We should perhaps be wary of using hindsight to criticize the follies of 1839, although Perovsky 
and Auckland were not exactly the sort of people that E.P. Thompson had in mind when he 
referred to the historian’s task as rescuing his subjects ‘from the enormous condescension of 
posterity’.141 From our current standpoint, British and Russian imperialist adventures in Central 
Asia seem morally repugnant in and of themselves, but it is still important to understand why 
they were unable to translate their substantial military superiority into victory and territorial 
annexation—or even a stable diplomatic relationship with the Central Asian states. In the 
aftermath of the Afghanistan disaster, people flocked to denounce Auckland’s policy, but fewer 
condemnatory voices were heard beforehand. The failure of the Khiva expedition, meanwhile, 
could be attributed to an Act of God over which nobody had any control. However, in both 
cases there were contemporary voices that pointed out the errors in British and Russian policy, 
and it is important to establish why they were not listened to. For Afghanistan, the most 
celebrated is that of Sir Alexander Burnes—‘the martyr of Kabul’—canonized after his death by 
Sir John Kaye and by his surviving relatives.142 Although Burnes had initially wanted the British to 
support Dost Muhammad, once that had been ruled out by Auckland, he agreed to support the 
alternative policy of restoring Shah Shuja—his private correspondence makes it quite clear that 
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he considered some kind of decisive action to counter Russian intrigues to be the overriding 
priority, and that his own personal ambition played a substantial part in this.143  
In any case, Burnes’s misgivings are so well known that he can hardly be considered a silenced 
voice, and on the subject of the Russian threat he was listened to —with disastrous results. 
Instead, even using purely British and Russian accounts, it rapidly becomes clear that the voices 
that were almost entirely ignored were those of the ‘natives’ or ‘tuzemtsy’. This can be seen, first, 
in accounts of diplomatic relations, where neither the British nor the Russians were prepared to 
deal with Central Asian rulers on anything approaching equal terms,. This disregard is echoed in 
much ‘Great Game’-dominated historiography, which views Central Asia as no more than a 
‘chessboard’ on which the great powers made their moves and ignores the crucial role played by 
local states and their rulers.144  
Perovsky entirely ignored the repeated attempts of Allah Quli Khan to reach a negotiated 
settlement of the outstanding grievances between Russia and Khiva. On the khan’s side, this 
included the construction of the Russian fortress at Novo-Alexandrovsk on what he considered 
to be Khivan territory; for the Russians this matter was not even negotiable.145 The Russians 
responded to these overtures (which Ivanin would later describe as a typical instance of Oriental 
untrustworthiness) by detaining all Khivan ambassadors and merchants and refusing further 
dialogue.146 Meanwhile, both Burnes and Abbott had a greatly exaggerated idea of the 
attractiveness of a British alliance to Central Asian rulers. Allah Quli Khan had sent a 
straightforward response to a letter from Pottinger in Herat that had requested him to satisfy 
Russia’s grievances by releasing the slaves at Khiva. After pointing out that Yar Muhammad 
Khan, who ruled Herat under British auspices, was also a keen slave trader, Allah Quli Khan 
wrote that he was preparing for conflict with Russia and asked the British to send him some 
experienced artillerymen as a mark of their good faith.147 The government of India consistently 
refused to offer anything other than empty assurances of friendship. As the prime minister 
(mehtar) of Khiva bluntly told Abbott: ‘What then have you come hither for? If you will grant 
none of our demands, of what use is it to call yourselves our allies?’148 Similarly, in response to 
Lord Auckland’s grudging offer to ‘restrain’ Ranjit Singh in return for Dost Muhammad’s 
allegiance, Nawab Jabbar Khan, one of the amir’s brothers, who was friendlier to the British than 
any other Barakzai, told Burnes plainly that British promises to ‘protect’ Dost Muhammad 
against Ranjit Singh were worthless, as the Afghan ruler did not fear an attack from that quarter:  
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… it appeared that we valued our offers at a very high rate, since we expected in return that the 
Afghans would desist from all intercourse with Persia, Russia, Toorkistan, & c. Were the Afghans 
to make all these powers hostile, and receive no protection against the enmity raised for their 
adhering to the British?’149  
Many of the subsequent mistakes made by Auckland and his cabinet stemmed from a refusal to 
accept the justice of this remark, as repeated opportunities to establish good diplomatic relations 
with Dost Muhammad were spurned. The sad tale of the disasters that followed the decision to 
depose him and set up Shuja ul-Mulk is too well known to be rehearsed at length here, but an 
inability or refusal to understand local points of view remained a common factor.150 As Kim 
Wagner has shown, although ‘native informants’ remained important to the British in the early 
nineteenth century and were often invoked to add authority to intelligence reports, the raw 
information they provided was increasingly ignored or woven into new and fantastical forms if it 
did not coincide with official preconceptions.151  
Beyond the frontiers of the East India Company’s territory, increasingly the crucial figure was not 
the independent local ‘newswriter’, but the British agent who reinterpreted his missives to suit his 
own purposes and repackaged them for Calcutta, of which Burnes was the pre-eminent 
example.152 He certainly had a network of informants, who ensured that he knew that all was not 
well, as he frequently noted in his letters before the disaster.153 However, in the days leading up to 
his murder Burnes also ignored numerous warnings from ‘native’ sources. The most vehement of 
these came from his erstwhile companion, the Kashmiri, Mohan Lal.154 Lal survived the 
massacres, and would subsequently provide some clear-sighted analyses of what went wrong, but 
it is instructive to compare the reception of his writings on the Kabul disaster with those of 
British critics such as Burnes, Kaye or David Urquhart. General Pollock, forwarding Lal’s report 
on the affairs of Afghanistan, wrote that ‘The subject is one of two [sic] great importance to be 
ably treated by a person so indifferently educated as the Moonshee.’155 It was clear that most of 
the value attached to Lal’s testimony was because of his association with Burnes: he could be an 
informant, but not an agent in his own right. Lal was still in Kabul, living in the house of a 
merchant called ‘Khan Sheree’.156 He thus had access to better intelligence than either the 
garrison at Jalalabad or the British hostages seized by the Afghans (the other main sources of 
information at this stage). His memorandum summed up the various reasons why the rebellion in 
Kabul had taken place and why the garrison there had failed to quell it. He focused primarily on 
the inadequacy of Shah Shuja’s ministers, the drunkenness of the British troops, the sexual 
conquests made by their officers among the Afghan women, the decision to withdraw allowances 
from many of the tribes in Kohistan and along the vital supply route to the Khyber (where he 
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himself had been sent on an unsuccessful placatory mission), continual disagreements between 
Macnaghten and Burnes, and finally the indecision and double-dealing in which Macnaghten and 
Elphinstone had indulged after Burnes’s murder.157 Yapp has since argued convincingly that, 
important as all these factors were, the root cause of the rebellion was the prospect many of the 
Kabul-based Afghan elite faced of seeing their power-base and revenues eroded by the new 
military structures which the Anglo-Sadozai government was seeking to introduce, but Lal’s was 
surely the earliest complete summary of the failings of British policy and remains one of the most 
accurate.158 Lal also revealed that he had warned Macnaghten that his life was in danger on the 
eve of his murder by Dost Muhammad’s son, Muhammad Akbar Khan, and begged him not to 
attend his fatal rendezvous with the Afghan leader, but that he had been ignored.159 Lal would 
later reproduce some of these descriptions and conclusions in his Life of Dost Muhammad Khan, 
which received a strikingly negative critical reaction.160 The reviewer for Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine described the book as dull, wordy, and stale, adding caustically that in his admiring 
portrayal of the amir he was ‘thus betraying a certain Oriental laxity of principle which European 
education and Society might be expected to eradicate’.161 The Calcutta Review was equally sneering, 
‘Historical accuracy being thus set aside, as of impossible attainment, Mohan Lal, Esquire, 
doubtless, determines to compensate for this important deficiency, by extraordinary graces of 
style—the excellence of the manner atoning for the imperfections of the matter. Not at all.’ 
Instead the reviewer took strong exception to what he saw as the deficiencies of Lal’s English, 
while also accusing him of ‘an absence of all capacity to discern the important from the 
unimportant’.162 
As Bayly and Hopkins have concluded, the growing British tendency to disregard information 
from ‘native sources’ was a crucial factor in the colossal intelligence failures that surrounded the 
First Afghan War.163 In the case of the Khiva expedition, there are clear parallels. The freezing 
weather may have been beyond Perovsky’s control, but he took the decision to continue the 
advance, even as conditions deteriorated still further—had he turned back earlier many lives 
would have been saved. Throughout his later memoir of the expedition, Ivanin referred to the 
Kazakhs on whom the force relied for the management of its camels in the most disparaging 
terms, as ‘asiatics unworthy of entire confidence’, and bemoaned the lack of reliable information 
about routes to Khiva because ‘the testimony on these points of the asiatics who have been there, 
because of their inclination to deceit [obman] and exaggeration, can in no degree be relied upon’.164 
He often noted the possibility that they might mutiny or go over to the Khivans. Matters came to 
a head when the columns prepared to move off from the fortification at Aty-Yakshi on the river 
Emba, which they had only reached with the greatest difficulty, through still deeper snow to the 
advanced post at Aq Bulaq, when the 300 Kazakh drivers with the leading column refused to 
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carry on; when threatened with death, they ‘stated that they were all prepared to die, but that to 
go on was against their faith, and that caravans never travelled when there was such a frost’.165 
Two of the ringleaders were then seized and shot, and the crowd eventually dispersed. 
Revealingly, when Perovsky reminisced about this incident during a recuperative sojourn in 
Rome, he transformed it into a grotesque anecdote about a ‘mullah’ accompanying the 
expedition, who refused to obey orders and only yielded once Perovsky had shot two of his sons 
and was about to send the third to the firing-squad.166 He had chosen to remember it as an 
instance of Islamic ‘fanaticism’, an interpretation echoed in several other Russian accounts of the 
‘mutiny’ and subsequent executions: all refer to this as a moment of crisis, where Perovsky’s 
decisive action saved the column from being stranded in the steppe by their unreliable Kazakh 
allies. Ivanin also attributed the rebellion to Kazakh ‘fanaticism’ stimulated by Khivan 
propaganda, placing great emphasis on the ‘wild shouts’ of the Kazakhs and saying nothing about 
the more practical objections of the drivers to proceeding any further.167 Peslyak, however, wrote 
that it was the freezing conditions that caused the Kazakh drovers to try to halt the expedition,168 
and Dal’ wrote that the Kazakhs claimed the camels were simply not up to the journey.169 There 
is also a striking contrast between what Perovsky reported the Kazakhs as saying in his original 
missive and the reasons he then adduces for their discontent. It seems clear that it was the sheer 
insanity of trying to travel in the steppe under such conditions that had aroused the drivers’ 
anger, not fears of a possible Khivan attack. In effect they were telling Perovsky what he would 
belatedly discover for himself a month later at Aq Bulaq, when he announced that the expedition 
would have to turn back owing to the severity of the weather.170 By that time, not only would 
over half his camels be dead, almost half his men would also be either dead or incapacitated by 
frostbite and scurvy. In ignoring the views of those who actually lived on the Steppe and failing 
to turn back earlier, when most of his camels were still alive, Perovsky had been guilty of a folly 
almost as great as that of Macnaghten and Elphinstone at Kabul.  
Whether we view Britain and Russia’s aims in the region as being primarily those of annexation 
or dominance, or take at face value the claims made by their leaders that all they sought were 
stable frontiers, the protection of trade, and the release of slaves, it is clear that both powers 
systematically undermined these aims through their failure to regard either Central Asian rulers or 
Central Asian informants as worthy of serious consideration as equal partners, and instead to 
assume their ‘fanaticism’, ignorance, and bad faith from the very outset. 
Conclusion 
Khiva would not fall to a Russian army until 1873, and after the punitive expedition they sent to 
avenge the army of the Indus in the autumn of 1842, it would be almost 40 years before the 
British were once again drawn into meddling in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Yapp has argued 
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that both the British and the Russians suffered severe rebuffs and realized that the costs of a 
‘forward strategy’ in Central Asia outweighed the likely benefits.171  
Although the First Afghan War almost bankrupted the East India Company,172 and the British 
certainly drew in their horns after 1842, the pace of expansion hardly slackened, as first Sind and 
then Punjab were annexed between 1843 and 1849, though this was in many ways a consequence 
of the failure of the Afghan strategy of frontier defence. The fear that rumours of a Russian 
advance might provoke rebellion in India remained persistent, even after the Anglo-Russian 
agreement of 1907, but with these caveats Yapp’s conclusion seems fair.173  
The lessons Russia learned from the Khivan disaster (which was less financially damaging) were 
more complicated. First, it was not until 1842 that it became clear that the British adventure in 
Afghanistan had been a catastrophe. Before then, the Russians felt that they had been 
comprehensively outmanoeuvred (or at any rate out-spent) by the British in Central Asia. In 
January 1840 Major-General Verigin urged that the occupation of Khiva be made permanent 
once the expedition reached its destination, claiming that otherwise—‘instigated by the English 
and with the aid of their skilled officers’—the khanate would improve its defences and prove 
resistant to future attacks.174 The expedition’s failure rendered such a scheme impossible and 
deepened Russian worries still further. Perovsky wrote vehemently to Nesselrode that once 
Afghanistan had fallen, Bukhara could be next.175 Duhamel also wrote from Tehran that British 
influence would soon spread from Afghanistan to the Caspian littoral, snuffing out Russian trade 
and other interests and compromising its security.176 In the same despatch Duhamel also 
complained about Richmond Shakespear’s activities in Khiva. Russian paranoia was reinforced by 
the presence of British agents beyond the Oxus. However inept James Abbott’s mission to Khiva 
appears with hindsight, he certainly succeeded in annoying Perovsky, who fulminated over his 
presumption and the flimsiness of his credentials.177 Perovsky and Nesselrode agreed that as 
Abbott’s reception in Khiva did not appear to have been particularly friendly or to have achieved 
a great deal, it would be unwise to worsen relations with Britain by punishing him for what they 
regarded as an illegitimate intrusion into Russia’s foreign affairs.178 In September, however, came 
the unwelcome news that Richmond Shakespeare had turned up at the Novo-Alexandrovsk 
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fortress with 416 liberated Russian slaves: this was a more substantial blow, as he appeared to 
have achieved single-handedly what the winter expedition of 1839–40 had failed to.179  
Even before the remains of the Khivan expedition had returned to Orenburg, officials were 
raising the question of how to maintain Russia’s prestige in Central Asia and counter perceptions 
of weakness. Prince Menshikov proposed a fort on the Syr-Darya as a means of responding to 
the debacle: ‘The taking of Kabul by the English and the approach of their forces to Bukhara 
must now, without doubt, be considered the main factor opposed to our influence’, and that the 
best means of combating it was to project Russian influence deep into the Steppe through 
fortifications.180 This would become the cornerstone of future Russian policy in Central Asia. 
Although the British were so scarred by their experience in Afghanistan that they left it alone for 
40 years, the Russians drew practical lessons from the failure of the Khivan expedition and did 
not abandon their determination to subdue both the nomadic peoples who populated the 
empire’s southern frontier and the sedentary states beyond them, which they assumed were 
responsible for most of the military problems they encountered in the Steppe. As Ivanin put it in 
a dyspeptic response to the unauthorized publication of his reminiscences, the expedition had 
taught some tactical lessons about steppe warfare.181 Perovsky’s failure had shown that the 
difficulties of movement and maintaining supply lines needed for steppe campaigning meant that 
long-distance expeditions were not feasible. Instead the Russians would push their frontier south 
by building a new line of fortresses, beginning in 1845 with the construction of small forts on the 
rivers Irgiz and Turgai by the new governor of Orenburg, General Obruchev. 
Neither power learned the most important lessons of all from these debacles. The first was that 
their fear of each other’s intentions in the region had been exaggerated by ambitious ‘men on the 
spot’ until they became mutually reinforcing—a ‘contest to get there first’, which led them into 
serious errors.182 The second was that, even following their own imperialist logic, they should 
have listened to the advice, opinions, and intelligence provided by Central Asians themselves. A 
comparison of the origins of these twin imperial disasters thus reveals that the Russian ‘official 
mind’—the assumptions, prejudices, and mental universe of its ruling military elite—was 
remarkably similar to that of its British counterpart in India. Like the British, the Russians did not 
see Central Asia’s states as rational, sovereign polities open to the usual niceties of diplomacy and 
negotiation, but as savage, backward, unreliable, and amenable only to force. The only difference 
was that, while British fears of the extension of Russian influence into Afghanistan were largely 
illusory, Russian attempts to counter their exclusion from Afghanistan by the British succeeded in 
triggering a very real invasion and occupation that, for a while, seemed to have dealt a heavy blow 
to Russian prestige and trade in the region. The subsequent catastrophic collapse of the Anglo-
Sadozai regime came about because of local factors of which the Russians had been entirely 
ignorant.  
Forty years before the ‘Scramble for Africa’, during a period of what is often seen as largely 
unchallenged British global hegemony, where ‘informal’ influence sufficed to defend British 
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interests, competition with another European power was already a key determinant of imperial 
expansion in Asia.183  
Russian insecurities and their wariness of British dominance are less surprising, but it is striking 
how often their language of fear and vulnerability was echoed on the British side. As with Egypt, 
Sudan, and East Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, the invasions of Afghanistan and Khiva were pre-
emptive and intended to thwart the imagined designs and intrigues of another European power 
on a piece of territory.184 Robinson and Gallagher also note that a key factor in British expansion 
in Africa was the profound distrust and ignorance of the ‘official mind’ when confronted with 
‘native’ leaders such as ‘Urabi Pasha, whom it considered to be ‘fanatical’ and impossible to 
negotiate with.185 Once again, there was nothing new in this attitude: it was another facet of the 
growing racial arrogance and intolerance which, as Bayly has shown, gradually crippled British 
intelligence networks within India, culminating in the domestic disasters of 1857.186 Twenty years 
before this, mutually reinforcing fears of British and Russian intrigue, combined with a refusal to 
take ‘native’ sources or ‘native’ rulers seriously, had produced twin foreign policy disasters on a 
similar scale.  
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